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Introduction
The question whether money plays a causal role for output has created a large literature over the years, and the discussion has been particularly heated for the U.S.. Ever since Sims (1972, p. 540) concluded that the hypothesis that causality is unidirectional from money to income agrees with the postwar U.S. data, researchers have vigorously prodded the robustness of the money-output link. The intensity of the debate is explained by its importance for macroeconomic theory and monetary policy, but it also reflects the fact researchers have come to vastly different conclusions.
To some extent, these differences seem to be driven by varying empirical approaches. Sims (1980) argues that the money-output link tends to be weaker in empirical models including a larger number of variables. King and Plossser (1984) , Christiano and Ljungquist (1988) , and Stock and Watson (1989) observe that using narrower monetary aggregates, growth rates instead of levels, or levels without properly modeling trends, respectively, tends to bias results against money.
1 Thoma (1994) points out that forcing a symmetrical outputeffect of money has the same effect. Chao et al. (2001) argue that applying out-of-sample instead of within-sample tests also reduces the role of money.
Using Bayesian Vector Autoregressive (BVAR) modeling techniques, we find surprisingly strong evidence that money Granger-causes output over the 1960-2005 period. The full sample findings are particularly robust in the sense that they are based on an out-of-sample forecasting approach including symmetrical multivariate BVAR models using money growth-an approach that, based on the literature up to date, should introduce a bias against finding a money-output link.
But there are also clear indications of a systematic reduction in the role of money after the 'Great moderation' of the mid-1980s. In fact, we show that money ceases to Granger-cause output around Paul Volcker's chairmanship at the Federal Reserve. This supports arguments made by Friedman and Kuttner (1993) and Psaradakis et al. (2005) stressing the importance of sample length and seems to contradict Swanson's (1998) (Ashley et al., 1980) and avoids problems of within-sample tests in multivariate frameworks. Using Bayesian VAR methods allow us to describe the data generating process but avoid over-parameterization, which hurts forecasting performance (Doan et al., 1984; Litterman, 1986 ).
Our forecasting model is given by ( )
is a lag polynomial of order p, t x is an nx1 vector of stationary macroeconomic variables and t η is an nx1 vector of iid error terms fulfilling
. In the fourvariate BVAR model, we have and t i representing real GDP growth, money growth, inflation, and interest rates, respectively. In the trivariate, bivariate, and univariate models, we have
, and
, respectively. In all models, the lag length is set to 4 = p . We use a Minnesota-style prior on the dynamics: For variables in levels (first differences), the prior mean on the coefficient on the first own lag is one (zero); all other coefficients in i G have a prior mean of zero. The prior for the covariance matrix is a mainstream diffuse prior.
2 Both Friedman and Kuttner (1993) and Psaradakis et al. (2005) focus on within-sample evidence. The latter use Markov-switching to distinguish between periods with/without Granger-causality of money in a bivariate setting, restricting the underlying models to be the same across time. 3 It should be noted that no valid test exists to test the null hypothesis of equal forecasting performance in our setting, that is, with recursively generated forecasts from nested models and a forecast horizon that is larger than one (Clark and McCracken, 2005) .
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Our quarterly data ranges from 1960Q1 to 2005Q3 and were provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Figure 1 ). With the exception of the interest rate, all series are seasonally adjusted. Inflation is based on the consumer price index and the monetary aggregate is M2. The interest rate is the three-month treasury bill rate. All growth rates are calculated using logarithmic first-differences of the original series in levels, and all variables are measured in percent. For ease of interpretation, we will present RMSEs for fourquarter ended growth rates. 
Money and Output Growth 1960-2005
We start by comparing the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of model (1) The forecasting method is standard: for each draw from posterior coefficient distribution of a given model, we draw a sequence of shocks to generate future data. 4 The evaluation is based on the median forecast from the predictive density. Forecasting horizon (quarters) The results seem to suggest that money is indeed Granger-causal for output during the 1968-2005 period, in particular at horizons up to two years. That the improvement in forecasting accuracy is particularly strong compared to the trivariate model, where the RMSEs drop at all horizons and by as much as 0.12 percentage points when incorporating money growth, seems to stress the robustness of the finding. 
The Vanishing Role of Money
There is, however, reason to suspect that the relationship between money and output changed over time. Paul Volcker's eight-year chairmanship of the Federal Reserve System's Board of Governors starting in August 1979 is an often cited watershed separating the highinflation period of the 1970s from the calmer times that followed (that is, the 'Great moderation')-an event that presumably also changed the dynamic relation of money and output. Figure 3 shows that the contribution of money to forecasting output differs starkly before and after 1979. Keeping the length of the training periods constant, the solid and dotted lines depict the change in forecasting performance from adding money growth during the two forecasting periods 1968Q1-1979Q1 and 1987Q3-2005Q2. 5 While the findings for the first period identify money growth as Granger-causal for real GDP growth for horizons of up to 8 quarters, the second period clearly does not. Forecasting horizon (quarters) Notes: RMSEs for four-quarter ended growth rates. 5 The starting point for the second period was set at Volcker's introduction as chairman. Both subsamples use an eight-year training sample. The forecast evaluations are based on 46-35 and 73-62 observations, respectively, depending on the forecast horizon. 6 Further results show that the change in the money-output link identified here was indeed not a gradual one. Computing RMSE differences for alternative out-of-sample forecasting periods of similar length we find that money ceases to Granger-cause output rather suddenly around 1979 or 1980 as suggested by Figure 3 . Specifically, we compared results for forecasting windows for 1967Q3-1985Q2, 1972Q3-1990Q2, 1977Q3-1990Q2, 1982Q3-2000Q2, and 1987Q3-2005Q2 for both models, with a unified six-year training period. Additional results available on request.
7
Conclusion
The question whether money plays a causal role for output has created a large literature over the years, and the discussion has been particularly heated for the U.S.. To some extent, these differences seem to be driven by varying empirical approaches. Choosing a setup commonly considered as biased against finding a money-output link, we still find surprisingly strong evidence that money Granger-causes output out-of-sample over the 1960-2005 period. Further investigation puts these results into doubt though, as we show that the Granger-causal role of money has vanished completely after the 'Great moderation'. Our findings hence support earlier results stressing the importance of sample length for the money-output link and also indicate potential importance of the policy regime.
